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THE LAW OF SMALL NUMBERS: GONZALES
V. CARHART, PARENTS INVOLVED IN
COMMUNITY SCHOOLS, AND SOME THEMES
FROM THE FIRST FULL TERM OF THE
ROBERTS COURT*
PAMELA S. KARLAN**
This Article uses two of the blockbuster decisions of the 2006 Term,
Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District
No. 1 and Gonzales v. Carhart (Carhart II), as a lens for
considering how the Roberts Court may deal with key questions of
constitutional law. It begins by showing that the divisions among
the Justices are not just doctrinal or methodological, but may reflect
deep disagreements in their cultural worldviews. These
disagreements, which have also appeared in some of the Court's
other opinions, may foreshadow a Court sharply divided across a
wide range of issues. The Article then turns to how the Court's
decisions handle two central features of constitutional adjudication:
the level of deference to be accorded to the political branches and
the method of constitutional challenge. It suggests that the Roberts
Court may be embarking upon an attempt to reintegrate
desegregation and abortion rights jurisprudence into more general
constitutional categories. Finally, this Article looks at how the
Court's opinions in Parents Involved and Carhart II stake their
claim to legitimacy as the true heirs to central values derived from
Brown v. Board of Education and Roe v. Wade.
* Copyright © 2008 by Pamela S. Karlan.
** Kenneth and Harle Montgomery Professor of Public Interest Law, Stanford Law
School. I presented earlier versions of this Article as the Frank Irvin Lecture at Cornell
Law School and at the University of North Carolina School of Law's Symposium on
Precedent and the Roberts Court. Many of the ideas in this essay came initially from
conversations I had with Anurima Bhargava, Debo Adegbile, Cilla Smith, Reva Siegel,
and Viola Canales. In the interest of full disclosure, I should note that I served as counsel
for the petitioners in Crawford v. Marion County Election Board, No. 07-21 (U.S. argued
Jan. 9, 2008), and as counsel for amicus California Medical Association in Gonzales v.
Carhart (Carhart 11), 550 U.S. -, 127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007), two of the cases discussed in this
Article. The views I express in this Article are entirely my own.
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INTRODUCTION
During October Term 2006, the Supreme Court of the United
States decided fewer cases than during any Term since the end of the
Civil War.1 A full third of the cases were decided by a five-to-four
vote, the highest proportion in more than a decade.2 And in all those
five-to-four decisions, Justice Anthony Kennedy was in the majority.3
One version of the law of small numbers tells us to be wary of
attempts to generalize about a sequence from the first few items.4
Thus, it would be risky to predict where the Roberts Court will go on
the basis of only a Term and a half's worth of decisions.
But although there have not yet been many decisions from the
Roberts Court, the decisions so far suggest an eagerness to revisit
doctrines across the legal spectrum. Sometimes, the Court has
expressly overruled prior cases. In Leegin Creative Leather Products
v. PSKS, Inc.,5 the Court expressly overruled Dr. Miles Medical Co. v.
John D. Park & Sons Co.,6 abandoning the per se prohibition of
resale price maintenance agreements under the Sherman Antitrust
Act.7 In Bowles v. Russell,8 the Court expressly overruled the
"unique circumstances" rule of Harris Truck Lines, Inc. v. Cherry
1. Posting of David Stras to SCOTUSblog, http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/2007/05/
page/5/ (May 3, 2007, 21:25 CDT).
2. Posting of Adam Chandler to SCOTUSblog, http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/2007/
07/page/4/ (July 2, 2007, 09:48 CDT).
3. Memorandum from Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP 2 (June 28, 2007),
available at http://www.scotusblog.com/movabletype/archivesMemoOT06.pdf.
4. See generally Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Belief in the Law of Small
Numbers, in A HANDBOOK FOR DATA ANALYSIS IN THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES:
METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES 341 (Gideon Keren & Charles Lewis eds., 1993) (discussing
how individuals often mistakenly believe that small samples are representative of the
larger population from which they are drawn).
5. 551 U.S. -, 127 S. Ct. 2705 (2007).
6. 220 U.S. 373 (1911), overruled by Leegin, 551 U.S. at __, 127 S. Ct. at 2710.
7. Leegin, 551 U.S. at -, 127 S. Ct. at 2710.
8. 551 U.S. -, 127 S. Ct. 2360 (2007).
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Meat Packers, Inc. , which had permitted otherwise untimely appeals
when the untimeliness stemmed from reliance on a district court
order. ° And in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly," the Court suggested
that the longstanding Conley v. Gibson12 rule that "a complaint
should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears
beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of
his claim which would entitle him to relief,"13 had "earned its
retirement." 4 More aggressively, individual Justices have called on
the Court to overrule core cases involving taxpayer standing, 5
campaign finance regulation, 6 the First Amendment rights of school
children, 7 and qualified immunity. 8  And this list does not even
include a number of additional cases in which concurring or
dissenting judges castigated the majority for overruling existing
doctrine sub silentio.'9
9. 371 U.S. 215 (1962); see also Thompson v. INS, 375 U.S. 384, 386-87 (1964)
(applying Harris Truck Lines).
10. Bowles, 551 U.S. at __ 127 S. Ct. at 2366.
11. 550 U.S. -, 127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007).
12. 355 U.S. 41 (1957), abrogated by Twombly, 550 U.S. __, 127 S. Ct. at 1969.
13. Id. at 45-46.
14. Twombly, 550 U.S. at __ 127 S. Ct. at 1969. Two weeks later, however, in
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. _, 127 S. Ct. 2197 (2007) (per curiam), the Court seemed to
backtrack somewhat, quoting a portion of Twombly that had in turn quoted Conley's
statement that, in a complaint, "[s]pecific facts are not necessary; the statement need only
'give the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it
rests.' " Id. at -, 127 S. Ct. at 2200 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at __, 127 S. Ct. at 1964).
15. Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., 551 U.S -, -, 127 S. Ct. 2553, 2574
(2007) (Scalia, J., joined by Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (calling on the
Supreme Court to repudiate Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968), which recognized taxpayer
standing to challenge government expenditures under the Establishment Clause, id. at 88).
16. FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. -, -, 127 S. Ct. 2652, 2684-87 (2007)
(Scalia, J., joined by Kennedy and Thomas, JJ., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment) (urging the Court to overrule its prior decision upholding section 203 of the
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, § 203, 116 Stat. 81, 91-92
(codified at 2 U.S.C. § 441b (2000 & Supp. V 2005))).
17. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. -, -, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2630 (2007) (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (urging the Court to overrule Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist.,
393 U.S. 503 (1969), which had recognized the First Amendment rights of students
attending public schools).
18. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S .... 127 S. Ct. 1769, 1780-81 (2007) (Breyer, J.,
concurring) (urging the Court to revisit the requirement announced in Saucier v. Katz, 533
U.S. 194 (2001), that lower courts faced with claims of qualified immunity first resolve the
merits of the plaintiff's constitutional claim before addressing whether the law was clearly
established at the time the defendant acted).
19. See, e.g., Wis. Right to Life, 551 U.S. at -, 127 S. Ct. at 2687 (Souter, J., joined by
Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., dissenting) (accusing the majority of overruling its
prior decision in McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003)); Brewer v. Quarterman, 550 U.S.
.... 127 S. Ct. 1706, 1723 (2007) (Scalia, J., joined by Thomas and Alito, JJ., dissenting)
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But the two decisions that raise the most profound questions
about the Roberts Court's relationship to precedent and its approach
to constitutional law more generally were the 2006 Term's
blockbusters: Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle
School District No. 1,2° which concerned the constitutionality of race-
conscious voluntary desegregation plans, and Gonzales v. Carhart
(Carhart 1,21 which concerned the constitutionality of the federal
Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003.22
In its first Term, the Roberts Court sidestepped similar
questions. With respect to voluntary desegregation, the Court
declined to review a decision upholding race-conscious student
assignment policies in the Lynn, Massachusetts, public schools.2 3
With respect to abortion, in Justice O'Connor's final opinion for the
Court, the Court unanimously remanded a challenge to New
Hampshire's abortion statute for reconsideration of the remedial
issue without saying very much at all about the nature of the
substantive due process interest at issue.24 In its second Term,
however, the Court confronted those issues head on, and the collision
produced sparks and splinters. In Parents Involved, the Court struck
down two school systems' voluntary desegregation plans. And in
Carhart II, the Court upheld a federal statute criminalizing the use of
a particular technique for performing abortions. Together, these
decisions served notice that the meaning and continued vitality of
several signature decisions of the Warren, Burger, and Rehnquist
Courts-Brown v. Board of Education,25 Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Board of Education,26 and Grutter v. Bollinger;27 and
Roe v. Wade28 and Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania
v. Casey29-are now up for grabs. They showed that even when the
Court declines to overrule existing precedent expressly, it seems
prepared to recast it-in Justice Scalia's colorful phrase, "beating [it]
to a pulp and then sending it out to the lower courts weakened,
(accusing the majority of overruling prior precedents regarding the application of Texas's
death penalty).
20. 551 U.S. -, 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007).
21. 550 U.S._, 127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007).
22. 18 U.S.C. § 1531 (Supp. V 2005).
23. Comfort v. Lynn Sch. Comm., 546 U.S. 1061, 1061 (2005) (denying certiorari).
24. Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New Eng., 546 U.S. 320 (2006).
25. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
26. 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
27. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
28. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
29. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
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denigrated, more incomprehensible than ever, and yet somehow
technically alive."30
This Article identifies several characteristics that the Court's
opinions in Parents Involved and Carhart II share, and that may shed
light on issues that will face the Roberts Court in the coming Terms.
Part I considers the way the Court's opinions frame the legal issues,
looking in particular at the Justices' choice of language. In both
Parents Involved and Carhart II, the divisions among the Justices are
not just doctrinal or methodological. They reflect deep disagreement
about how the Justices see the world around them. This
disagreement, which has appeared in some of the Court's other
opinions as well, may foreshadow a Court sharply divided across a
wide range of issues. Last Term's collection of five-to-four decisions
in important cases may turn out to be a central feature of the Roberts
Court-at least with its current membership.
Part II turns to how the opinions in Carhart II and Parents
Involved handle two central features of constitutional adjudication.
The first concerns the level of deference to be accorded to the
political branches. The Rehnquist Court had subjected both
governmental uses of race and governmental restrictions on abortions
to forms of heightened scrutiny.3' In neither Carhart II nor Parents
Involved, however, was the Court's application of the existing
structure of scrutiny entirely straightforward. The second concerns
the method of constitutional challenge. A hallmark of the Rehnquist
Court was its general resistance to facial, rather than as-applied,
constitutional challenges. In the area of abortion, however, that
resistance had been tempered significantly by the Court's willingness
to find a restriction facially invalid if "in a large fraction of the cases
in which [it] is relevant, it will operate as a substantial obstacle to a
woman's choice to undergo an abortion."32  Carhart II, however,
rejected the challengers' facial attack on the federal abortion statute,
in a significant way reintegrating abortion law into the more general
30. Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., 551 U.S. -, -, 127 S. Ct. 2553, 2584
(2007) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (criticizing the Court's continued
recognition of taxpayer standing in cases challenging congressional enactments in light of
its refusal to apply a similar rule to cases involving challenges to Executive Branch action).
31. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pefla, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (holding that "all
racial classifications, imposed by whatever federal, state, or local governmental actor, must
be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny"); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 876-78 (1993) (holding that the state cannot pursue its interest in
fetal life by placing an undue burden on a woman's right to choose whether to terminate a
pregnancy).
32. Casey, 505 U.S. at 895.
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framework for determining the scope of a constitutional challenge.
And while Parents Involved accorded very different constitutional
significance to the fact that the challenged policy directly affected
relatively few individuals, it too may mark a significant reintegration
of school desegregation law into an emerging framework for
approaching governmental consideration of race.
Finally, Part III looks at how the opinions in Carhart II and
Parents Involved stake their claim to legitimacy as the true heirs to
central values derived from Roe v. Wade and Brown v. Board of
Education. In a stunning coincidence, both Carhart II and Parents
Involved bring back before the Court individuals who participated in
those foundational cases: Carhart II through citing an amicus brief
filed by Sandra Cano (the "Mary Doe" of Doe v. Bolton,3 3 the
companion case to Roe) and Parents Involved by quoting from the
oral argument of Robert L. Carter in Brown. Each time, the Court's
strategy raises more questions about the Court's adherence to
precedent than it settles.
I. THE FRAMING OF CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
On a number of occasions, Chief Justice Roberts has expressed a
strong desire for the Court to decide cases narrowly and
unanimously. 4 For cases to be decided this way, the Justices must
first agree on how to frame the issue before them: they are simply
not going to reach consensus if the question is "what does the
Fourteenth Amendment mean?"
Parents Involved and Carhart II illustrate one formidable
obstacle to reaching consensus on how to frame difficult legal
questions. The Justices are deeply divided not just on questions of
constitutional meaning or methodology; they seem sharply split on
how to describe the world around them.
The policies at issue in Parents Involved were promulgated by
local school boards in Seattle and Louisville. They were designed to
respond to the phenomenon, common among American jurisdictions,
that students of different races live in different parts of the
jurisdiction, and thus that student assignment policies that rely to any
33. 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
34. See, e.g., Jeffrey Rosen, Roberts's Rules, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Jan.-Feb. 2007, at
104, 110 (interviewing Chief Justice Roberts); Posting of Geoffrey R. Stone to The Blog,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/geoffrey-r-stone/chief-justice-roberts-and-b40277.html
(Feb. 2, 2007, 14:46 EST) (reporting on a speech by Chief Justice Roberts); Posting of Cass
Sunstein to the Faculty Blog, http://uchicagolaw.typepad.com/faculty/2006/05/chief-
justice-r.html (May 25, 2006, 09:52 CDT) (same).
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significant degree on where students live will likely produce a set of
schools with very different racial and ethnic compositions from one
another. The districts wanted to accomplish at least two things
through their assignment policies: first, they wanted to give
individual parents a choice among schools within the district; second,
they wanted to produce schools whose racial compositions did not
vary dramatically from one another. 5 In order to serve these goals,
the districts took students' race into account in deciding whether and
how to honor parents' preferences.36
The preceding paragraph contains an extraordinarily deracinated
description of the issue before the Court. The reason for my stilted
diction is not that I cannot describe things more concretely or
colorfully. Of course I can. But it took quite a long time to come up
with a description of the policies that does not use the terms deployed
by the various Justices in Parents Involved. Chief Justice Roberts, in
his opinion for the Court, identified the condition the districts sought
to address as " 'racial imbalance in the schools' "37-a racial
imbalance produced by private choice for which the government is
not responsible. Only once in his lengthy opinion did he use the
phrase "de facto segregation."38  Otherwise, he wrote as if the
condition of "imbalance" had nothing to do with the "segregation by
state action"39 forbidden by the Equal Protection Clause. Faced with
this constitutionally nonproblematic "imbalance," the districts-for
no reason he could discern-sought to achieve "racial balance,"4  a
phrase the Chief Justice sometimes modified with such words as
"outright" or "pure" or "for its own sake," as if the districts' goals had
been essentially about the appearance of class photographs.41 Indeed,
35. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S ..... 127 S.
Ct. 2738, 2746-47 (2007).
36. See id at __ 127 S. Ct. at 2747, 2749-50 (discussing the two plans).
37. See, e.g., id. at -, 127 S. Ct. at 2752 (quoting Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 280
n.14 (1977), for the proposition that "the Constitution is not violated by racial imbalance
in the schools, without more"); id. at -, 127 S. Ct. at 2761 (drawing a "distinction between
segregation by state action and racial imbalance caused by other factors").
38. Id. at__ 127 S. Ct. at 2761.
39. Id. at_, 127 S. Ct. at 2761.
40. Id. at __ 127 S. Ct. at 2746; see also, e.g., id. at __, 127 S. Ct. at 2755 (referring to
districts' goal as "racial balance, pure and simple"); id. at __ 127 S. Ct. at 2757 (implying
that districts were seeking " '[r]acial balance ... for its own sake' " (quoting Freeman v.
Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 494 (1992))); id. (comparing districts' goal to the prohibited practice of
"'outright racial balancing' " (quoting Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330 (2003))).
41. Indeed, the Chief Justice's opinion seemed to suggest that other verbal
formulations were simple subterfuges. See id. at _, 127 S. Ct. at 2758-59 ("While the
school districts use various verbal formulations to describe the interest they seek to
2008] 1375
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in his concurrence, Justice Thomas made this point explicit:
"Nothing," he wrote, "but an interest in classroom aesthetics and a
hypersensitivity to elite sensibilities justifies the school districts' racial
balancing programs."42
But Justice Thomas went further. He characterized the districts'
practices not just as "racial classification," which should trigger strict
scrutiny-and swift invalidation-but as "coerced racial mixing."43
That is a stunning phrase. It raises the question of who is being
coerced. And what are they being coerced to do? None of the
plaintiffs in either the Seattle or the Louisville schools claimed a right
to attend a monoracial public school. Such a claim would of course
have had no constitutional basis whatsoever. Indeed, the opinion for
the Court that Justice Thomas joined claimed elsewhere that the
illegitimacy of the race-conscious assignment policies was reinforced
by the fact that the schools would be racially mixed even in their
absence.' Ironically, given his repeated invocations of the arguments
offered by the plaintiffs in Brown v. Board of Education attacking
segregated schools, Justice Thomas's language is reminiscent of the
vocabulary of the segregationists. Professor Herbert Wechsler
described their position in explaining what he saw as a central tension
in Brown and its progeny: "if the freedom of association is denied by
segregation, integration forces an association upon those for whom it
is unpleasant or repugnant."45 It seems paradoxical to describe the
constitutional evil of race-conscious student assignment policies like
Seattle and Louisville's as "forced racial mixing" when a plaintiff is
challenging his exclusion from a racially mixed school.
By contrast, Justice Kennedy's concurrence and Justice Breyer's
dissent (which was joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg)
promote-racial diversity, avoidance of racial isolation, racial integration-they offer no
definition of the interest that suggests it differs from racial balance.").
42. Id. at __, 127 S. Ct. at 2770 n.3 (Thomas, J., concurring). Left unexplained in
Justice Thomas's concurrence is why the policy choices of a popularly elected school
board reflect a "hypersensitivity to elite sensibilities," rather than responsiveness to
majoritarian preferences.
43. Id. at _ 127 S. Ct. at 2776; see also id. at __ 127 S. Ct. at 2778 (describing the
districts' practices as "forced racial mixing").
44. See id. at __, 127 S. Ct. at 2756-57 (finding that even absent race-based
assignments, the schools would be racially diverse "under any definition of diversity").
45. Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L.
REV. 1, 34 (1959). I discuss the relationship between Brown v. Board of Education and
Wechsler's Neutral Principles article more fully in Pamela S. Karlan, What Can Brown Do
For You?, 58 DUKE L.J. (forthcoming Mar. 2009).
1376 [Vol. 86
LAW OF SMALL NUMBERS
described the problem the school boards faced as "racial isolation"46
and "segregation"47 and used phrases like "racially integrated
education,"'  "diverse student population,"49 and the "democratic
objective[]" 50 of "producing an educational environment that reflects
the 'pluralistic society' in which our children will live"'" to describe
the end state the districts were trying to produce. Thus, the
concurrence and the dissent saw racial separation as a persistent, and
persistently constitutionally troubling, aspect of American society,
while the majority saw the same facts on the ground as something
beyond the reach of government.
This gulf in language and sense of the world was equally evident
in Carhart H. There, the Court confronted a federal statute that
prohibited the performance of certain second-trimester abortions.
Abortion, far more than school assignment policies, has long been an
arena in which the competing positions use dramatically different
vocabularies. In Carhart II, the opinion for the Court used the
locution "abortion doctor" to refer to physicians who perform
abortions," rather than referring to them either as "doctors" or
"physicians" without elaboration or by their formal areas of medical
specialization such as surgeons or obstetrician-gynecologists 3.5  Like
the statute it upheld, the Court's opinion repeatedly referred to the
individual seeking or obtaining an abortion as a "mother. ' 54 It often
referred to the fetus as an "unborn child."55 By contrast, in discussing
46. See, e.g., Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at _, 127 S. Ct. at 2789 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); id at __ 127 S. Ct. at 2791; id. at _,
127 S. Ct. at 2796; id at __ 127 S. Ct. at 2820 (Breyer, J., dissenting); id. at , 127 S. Ct. at
2835.
47. See, e.g., id. at_, 127 S. Ct. at 2802 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
48. Id. at _, 127 S. Ct. at 2800.
49. Id. at .,127 S. Ct. at 2791 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
50. Id. at . 127 S. Ct. at 2835 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
51. Id. at -,127 S. Ct. at 2821 (quoting Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of
Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1970)).
52. Gonzales v. Carhart (Carhart II), 550 U.S.-.. 127 S. Ct. 1610, 1622, 1625, 1631,
1632, 1635, 1636 (2007).
53. Justice Kennedy took a very different tack in his opinion for the Court in
Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243 (2006). While he recognized that "the issue of
physician-assisted suicide ... has been the subject of an 'earnest and profound debate'
across the country," id. at 267 (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 735
(1997)), Justice Kennedy attached no descriptive adjectives (like "doctors of death" or
"suicide doctors") to physicians who sought to assist a terminally ill patient to end his or
her life by prescribing lethal drugs.
54. See, e.g., Carhart If, 550 U.S. at __, 127 S. Ct. at 1625, 1634, 1635.
55. See, e.g., id. at __, 127 S. Ct. at 1620, 1634.
2008] 1377
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the same actors, the dissent referred to "women," not "mothers," and
"doctors" and "physicians," without any additional adjective.56
What's striking in both Parents Involved and Carhart II is not
that the Justices on both sides choose their language to reinforce their
positions. Skilled writers usually do. Rather, it is that the gulf
between the two sides on questions of race and reproductive
autonomy seems so complete. The Justices are, almost literally, not
speaking the same language. Thus it is hardly surprising that they
reach very different conclusions about the constitutional questions
before them.
We can certainly expect that constitutional questions involving
race and abortion will continue to come before the Supreme Court.57
If anything, the Court's opinions in Parents Involved and Carhart H
may increase the amount of race- and abortion-related litigation
before the Court, because they unsettled preexisting doctrine.
The point about differing worldviews, however, extends beyond
these two areas: to take just one additional example from last Term,
consider the opinions in Scott v. Harris.8 The case involved a high-
speed chase in which a police officer rammed Harris's car, forcing it
off the road and over an embankment; the crash left Harris a
quadriplegic.59 The central legal question before the Court was
whether the officer had acted unreasonably, in which case his actions
would have violated the Fourth Amendment's prohibition on
56. For the dissenters' discussion of this linguistic gulf, see id. at -, 127 S. Ct. at 1650
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
57. In October Term 2008, for example, the Court will almost surely face the question
whether Congress's reauthorization of the special provisions of section 5 of the Voting
Rights Act of 1965, see Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, and Coretta Scott King Voting
Rights Act Reauthorization and Amendments Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-246, § 5, 120
Stat. 577, 580-81 (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 1973c (West Supp. 2007)), reflects a
permissible use of congressional power under the enforcement clauses of the
Reconstruction Amendments. Litigation challenging the reauthorization is already
underway before a three-judge district court in the District of Columbia. See Complaint,
Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Gonzales, No. 1:06-cv-01384 (D.D.C. Aug. 4,
2006). The Voting Rights Act confers mandatory appellate jurisdiction on the Supreme
Court. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1973c(a) (West Supp. 2007) ("Any action under this section shall
be heard and determined by a court of three judges in accordance with the provisions of
section 2284 of title 28 of the United States Code and any appeal shall lie to the Supreme
Court."). The Eighth Circuit is currently considering en banc the constitutionality of a
South Dakota statute that requires physicians to make a variety of ideologically charged
statements to their patients before performing an abortion. See Planned Parenthood
Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 467 F.3d 716 (8th Cir. 2006), reh'g granted, vacated, No. 05-
3093 (8th Cir. Jan. 9, 2007).
58. 550 U.S. -, 127 S. Ct. 1769 (2007).
59. Id. at _, 127 S. Ct. at 1773.
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unreasonable seizures.' The distinctive aspect of the case was that
the entire pursuit was filmed by cameras mounted in two of the police
cars involved. On its way to explaining why the officer's behavior was
reasonable, Justice Scalia's opinion for the Court declared itself
"happy to allow the videotape to speak for itself."'" According to the
Court, the way Harris drove posed such a danger to the safety of
others that the officers were entitled to use deadly force to end the
chase. No reasonable jury could conclude otherwise, and thus the
officers were entitled to summary judgment.62
Not all the Justices, however, thought the videotape said the
same thing. Justice Stevens dissented, arguing that the tape "actually
confirm[ed], rather than contradict[ing]," the view of all four judges
below,63 who had concluded that the case should be submitted to a
jury.' Justice Stevens described those judges as "surely more familiar
with the hazards of driving on Georgia roads than we are,"65 and in a
footnote, puckishly suggested that had his Supreme Court colleagues
"learned to drive when most high-speed driving took place on two-
lane roads rather than on superhighways-when split-second
judgments about the risk of passing a slow-poke in the face of
oncoming traffic were routine-they might well have reacted to the
videotape more dispassionately."66
In an intriguing experiment, Professors Dan Kahan, David
Hoffman, and Donald Braman took up the Court's invitation to
watch the Scott v. Harris tape.67 Actually, they showed the tape to
more than 1,300 Americans.68 Their experiment revealed significant
differences in the subjects' responses. While most of the sample
would have reached the same result as the Court, a substantial
fraction of the respondents would have decided the case in favor of
60. See id. at -, 127 S. Ct. at 1776.
61. Id. at _, 127 S. Ct. at 1775 n.5. The Court made the video available on its Web
site. See Scott v. Harris Video, http://www.supremecourtus.gov/opinions/video/scott-v_
harris.rmvb (last visited Apr. 14, 2008); see also Scott, 550 U.S. at __ 127 S. Ct. at 1780
(Breyer, J., concurring) ("Because watching the video footage of the car chase made a
difference to my own view of the case, I suggest that the interested reader take advantage
of the link in the Court's opinion, and watch it." (citation omitted)).
62. See Scott, 550 U.S. at _ 127 S. Ct. at 1779.
63. Id. at , 127 S. Ct. at 1781 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
64. See id at __, 127 S. Ct. at 1781.
65. Id. at __ 127 S. Ct. at 1781.
66. Id. at__ 127 S. Ct. at 1781 n.1.
67. Dan M. Kahan, David A. Hoffman & Donald Braman, Whose Eyes Are You
Going To Believe? Scott v. Harris and the Perils of Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 HARV. L.
REV. (forthcoming Jan. 2009) (manuscript at 1), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstractid=1081227.
68. Id. (manuscript at 4).
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Harris.69 Moreover, the differences in subjects' responses were
correlated with differences in their "cultural worldviews."7 ° Using a
framework developed by anthropologist Mary Douglas, which
classifies individuals' views along two dimensions-an
individualist/communitarian spectrum and a hierarchical/egalitarian
one-Kahan and his coauthors discovered marked differences in
subjects' views of the tapes.7 Presumably, the Justices too have
different cultural worldviews, and their differences may well be
reflected in their framing questions differently in areas such as
criminal justice, free speech, punitive damages, and the like.
II. THE STRENGTH AND SCOPE OF CONSTITUTIONAL SCRUTINY
The divisions on the Court reflected in Parents Involved and
Carhart II concern not only worldview but legal doctrine as well. In
particular, the cases reflected a continuing deep division over the
Court's relationship to other government actors, including legislatures
and local governments. A signal theme of the Rehnquist Court had
been its assertion of a particularly robust vision of judicial supremacy
in interpreting the Constitution.72 This vision was reflected, among
other places, in the Court's skeptical stance towards Congress.73 The
Rehnquist Court issued a series of opinions limiting the scope of the
Commerce Clause and Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment-two
of the three provisions, along with the spending power, that underpin
most congressional action.74 As a result of its interpretations of these
key constitutional provisions, the Rehnquist Court struck down more
federal statutes than any other Court in modern times.75 A second,
and related, feature of the Rehnquist Court was its revival of
federalism as a central constitutional value. This revival was reflected
in a stepped-up version of the Eleventh Amendment's conferral of
69. See id. (manuscript at 25-26) (reporting results).
70. See id. (manuscript at 29-39).
71. See id. (manuscript at 20-21) (describing anthropologist Mary Douglas's
identification of these dimensions of cultural worldviews); id. (manuscript at 39-40)
(describing how these differences in worldview correlated with different reactions to the
Scott v. Harris tape).
72. See, e.g., Larry D. Kramer, Foreword: We the Court, 115 HARV. L. REV. 4, 13-14,
128-58 (2001) (describing this development).
73. For a thorough discussion of this point, see generally Ruth Colker & James J.
Brudney, Dissing Congress, 100 MICH. L. REV. 80 (2001).
74. For a more extended discussion of this point, see generally Pamela S. Karlan,
Disarming the Private Attorney General, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 183 (analyzing the Court's
restrictive interpretation of congressional authority to grant private rights of action).
75. Michael J. Gerhardt, The Limited Path Dependency of Precedent, 7 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 903, 988 (2005).
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immunity from suit,76 a newly crafted anticommandeering doctrine
under the Tenth Amendment,77 and a further tightening of the
availability of habeas relief and structural reform injunctions.78
Underpinning many of the Rehnquist Court decisions was a
subsidiary decision about whether federal courts should defer to
other governmental actors' findings. The Court seemed
simultaneously to be more deferential to factfinding by state-level
actors and less deferential to factfinding by Congress. Compare, for
example, Grutter v. Bollinger,79 where the Court deferred to the
University of Michigan Law School's conclusions about the
importance of racial diversity in its student body and the need to take
race into account in its admissions decisions, with the Court's hostile
dissection of the legislative record underlying the Violence Against
Women Act in United States v. Morrison," or the record underlying
the employment-related provisions of the Americans with Disabilities
Act in Board of Trustees v. Garrett.8
For most of its life, the Rehnquist Court had the luxury of
interpreting the Constitution without reference to what Chief Justice
Marshall long ago called "the various crises of human affairs."82
Unlike the Warren Court, it did not face the moral crisis of American
apartheid, which ultimately demanded congressional engagement in
the form of the Civil Rights Act of 196483 and the Voting Rights Act
of 196584 to dismantle Jim Crow.85 Unlike the Roberts Court, it did
76. See Karlan, supra note 74, at 188-95 (discussing the Court's robust Eleventh
Amendment caselaw).
77. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997) (holding that Congress cannot
require state executive branch officials to implement federal commands); New York v.
United States, 505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992) (holding that Congress cannot require states to
pass laws implementing federal policy).
78. See, e.g., Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70 (1995) (limiting the scope of federal
desegregation remedies); Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) (restricting the retroactive
application of rules of criminal procedure in habeas proceedings).
79. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328 (2003) (deferring to the University of
Michigan's administration).
80. See 529 U.S. 598, 614-27 (2000) (concluding that Congress's findings were
inadequate to support legislation providing a federal civil remedy for assault).
81. See 531 U.S. 356, 368-74 (2001) (rejecting Congress's conclusion that there was a
serious problem of impermissible state discrimination against disabled employees).
82. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316,415 (1819).
83. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28
U.S.C., 42 U.S.C.).
84. Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1971 to
1973aa-6 (West 2003 & Supp. 2007)).
85. See Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, Groups, Politics, and the Equal
Protection Clause, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 35, 38 (2003) (pointing out that "[i]n those
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not, until its last years, face the national security crisis triggered by
the September 11 attacks. There is a direct line of descent from the
"cold war imperative" that contributed to the Court's decisions in
Brown and its progeny 6 to the post-9/11 Rehnquist Court's heavy
reliance in Grutter v. Bollinger on an amicus brief filed by retired
military officers to buttress its conclusion that racial diversity in
higher education constitutes a compelling governmental interest.87
The abortion law before the Court in Carhart II was distinctive in
that it was the first federal law directly restricting a woman's access to
abortion to come before the Court in recent years. The Congress that
passed the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003 was faced with the
Supreme Court's 2000 decision in Stenberg v. Carhart (Carhart I),88
which had struck down a quite similar Nebraska statute in part on the
grounds that the statute did not contain an exception for cases where
use of the forbidden procedure was necessary to preserve the health
of the woman.89 Nonetheless, Congress deliberately chose to exclude
a health exception in part as a straightforward challenge to the
Court's precedents.9" This challenge is reflected in the series of
findings at the beginning of the Act. Among them was the following:
in Stenberg, the Supreme Court had been "required"-presumably by
statutes, Congress required (and achieved) levels of equality substantially beyond
anything the courts had required on their own initiative").
86. See, e.g., Mary L. Dudziak, Desegregation as a Cold War Imperative, 41 STAN. L.
REV. 61 (1988) (describing how the U.S. government argued in favor of Brown on foreign
policy grounds); see also Mary L. Dudziak, The Little Rock Crisis and Foreign Affairs:
Race, Resistance, and the Image of American Democracy, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 1641, 1647-48
(1997) (explaining how the federal government's involvement in enforcing the
desegregation of Little Rock's schools reflected foreign affairs concerns).
87. In Pamela S. Karlan, Compelling Interests/Compelling Institutions: Law Schools as
Constitutional Litigants, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1613, 1625-26, 1628-30 (2007), I explore the
relationship between Grutter and its reliance on the military amicus brief and Rumsfeld v.
Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc. (FAIR), 547 U.S. 47 (2006). In FAIR, the
Court shifted from upholding the Solomon Amendment, 10 U.S.C. § 983 (2000 & Supp. V
2005)-part of which requires universities to provide extensive access to military recruiters
even though the military violates the schools' antidiscrimination policies with respect to
openly gay, lesbian, and bisexual students, § 983(b)-as a valid use of congressional
spending authority toward upholding it under an expansive reading of the Article I powers
connected to raising armies, see FAIR, 547 U.S. at 58-59.
88. 530 U.S. 914 (2000).
89. See id. at 929-30.
90. See, e.g., 149 CONG. REC. H4879, 4946 (daily ed. June 4, 2003) (statement of Rep.
DeLay) ("I came to the House to pass very strong, important legislation and then to fight
in the courts for my position. I do not let the courts decide what direction I go."); 148
CONG. REC. 14,240, 14,272-73 (2002) (statement of Rep. Linder) (replying to opponents
of the Act who "tell us we have no right to legislate a ban on this horrible practice because
the Supreme Court says we cannot" that "I believe the Congress has its own duty to create
and pass laws that protect the people of this country").
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general principles of federal civil procedure-"to accept the very
questionable findings issued by the district court judge,"'" but
Congress held itself "not bound to accept the same factual findings."92
Freed from the prior findings, Congress concluded that "[a] moral,
medical, and ethical consensus exists that the practice of performing a
partial-birth abortion ... is a gruesome and inhumane procedure that
is never medically necessary and should be prohibited."93
The Supreme Court recognized that under its controlling
precedents, including the unanimous decision the prior Term in
Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of Northern New England,94 the federal
Act would be unconstitutional "if it 'subject[ed] [women] to
significant health risks.' "I' And it recognized that Congress's
findings were, in several respects, demonstrably incorrect: the
evidence presented to the district courts undercut the claim of a
medical consensus in support of Congress's conclusion.96 Thus,
"[u]ncritical deference to Congress' factual findings in these cases is
inappropriate."97 Nonetheless, the Court upheld the prohibition.
It did so by abandoning a prior abortion-specific jurisprudence
that had entertained challenges to regulations of abortions as facial
challenges.98 The Rehnquist Court had adopted a general principle
that a law could be struck down as facially invalid only if the
challenger could "establish that no set of circumstances exists under
91. See Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-105, § 2(7), 117 Stat.
1201, 1202.
92. Id. § 2(8), 117 Stat. at 1202.
93. Id. § 2(1), 117 Stat. at 1201.
94. 546 U.S. 320 (2006) (holding that New Hampshire's parental involvement statute
would be unconstitutional if, as applied, it subjected a pregnant minor to a significant
health risk).
95. Gonzales v. Carhart (Carhart I1), 550 U.S ..... 127 S. Ct. 1610, 1635 (2007)
(alterations in original) (quoting Ayotte, 546 U.S. at 328).
96. Id. at -, 127 S. Ct. at 1637-38 ("As respondents have noted, and the District
Courts recognized, some recitations in the Act are factually incorrect. .... Congress also
found there existed a medical consensus that the prohibited procedure is never medically
necessary. The evidence presented in the District Courts contradicts that conclusion."
(citation omitted)).
97. Id. at __ 127 S. Ct. at 1638.
98. For an extensive and thoughtful discussion of the distinction between facial and
as-applied challenges, and its elaboration in Carhart H, as well as its implications for the
constitutionality of voter identification statutes-an issue I discuss later in this Article-
see generally Christopher S. Elmendorf, Undue Burdens on Voter Participation: New
Pressures for a Structural Theory of the Right To Vote?, HASTINGS CONST. L.Q.
(forthcoming 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=
1080256.
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which the Act would be valid."99 Challengers who could not meet this
standard were required instead to challenge the law "as applied"-
that is, to show that a particular application of the law exceeded the
legislature's power.'00 Citing a series of precedents from outside the
abortion context-with the sole exception of his dissent in Stenberg-
Justice Kennedy wrote that "[tihe Court has given state and federal
legislatures wide discretion to pass legislation in areas where there is
medical and scientific uncertainty."'' While the Court was prepared
to acknowledge that there might well be cases where the federal
abortion ban would be unconstitutional because of its omission of a
health exception, it found that the challengers "have not
demonstrated that the Act would be unconstitutional in a large
fraction of relevant cases."'0 2 Since the absence of a health exception
would be irrelevant in cases where a woman's health was not at issue,
most applications of the statute would pose no constitutional
difficulties. Citing the prior Term's per curiam decision in Wisconsin
Right to Life, Inc. v. FEC,°3 Justice Kennedy concluded that "[t]he
Act is open to a proper as-applied challenge."'"' In short, because the
lack of a health exception affected only a small number of women,
the law survived facial challenge.
As Justice Ginsburg pointed out in dissent, however, there was
no "fraction of relevant cases": the need for a health exception could
only be relevant in cases where a woman's health was at risk, and so
the fact that most women needing abortions would not be affected by
the lack of a health exception was simply beside the point.' The
Court seemed to conflate the conclusion that a law with a health
99. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987) (rejecting a facial challenge to
the Bail Reform Act of 1984). Mike Dorf has argued that the Court's hostility to facial
challenges is not quite as consistent as it claims and that the distinction between facial and
as-applied challenges is often more porous than the black-letter statements may suggest.
See Michael C. Dorf, Facial Challenges to State and Federal Statutes, 46 STAN. L. REV. 235,
294 (1994).
100. See Carhart II, 550 U.S. at _, 127 S. Ct. at 1638-39 (discussing the jurisprudence
of facial and as-applied challenges).
101. Id. at 127 S. Ct. at 1636.
102. Id. at 127 S. Ct. at 1639.
103. 546 U.S. 410 (2006).
104. Carhart II, 550 U.S. at __ 127 S. Ct. at 1639. Just to show how protean the
distinction between facial and as-applied challenges can sometimes be, the week after the
decision in Carhart II was announced, the Court heard oral argument in the second round
of the Wisconsin Right to Life challenge to portions of the McCain-Feingold campaign
finance law, and ultimately issued a decision with respect to an as-applied challenge that
resembled in all but name a decision to strike down the challenged provision wholesale.
See FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. _, _, 127 S. Ct. 2652, 2659 (2007).
105. See Carhart II, 550 U.S. at _, 127 S. Ct. at 1651 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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exception could constitutionally prohibit a large fraction of the
women seeking abortions from obtaining the procedure outlawed by
the federal Act-because the health exception would not apply to
them-with the idea that a health exception was not required in the
first place.
While Parents Involved did not involve the distinction between
facial and as-applied challenges, it did implicate questions of judicial
deference and the constitutional relevance of only small numbers of
individuals being affected by the government policy at issue. On both
these issues, the Court took a different approach in Parents Involved
than it had in Carhart H.
The Rehnquist Court had held, in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v.
Peha,0 6 that "all racial classifications, imposed by whatever federal,
state, or local governmental actor, must be analyzed by a reviewing
court under strict scrutiny. In other words, such classifications are
constitutional only if they are narrowly tailored measures that further
compelling governmental interests."' 7  Thus, among other things,
Parents Involved raised the question whether racial integration served
a compelling state interest. The debate was played out most explicitly
in the dueling opinions of Justice Thomas and Justice Breyer. In
dissent, Justice Breyer, relying on social scientific studies, argued that
there was a compelling "educational element" in providing integrated
education.0 8 While he recognized that there was disagreement
among social scientists, he concluded that "the evidence supporting
an educational interest in racially integrated schools is well
established and strong enough to permit a democratically elected
school board reasonably to determine that this interest is a
compelling one."'0 9 By contrast, Justice Thomas in his concurrence
pointed to the "fervent debate" among social scientists as a reason
not to defer to the decisions of elected officials. 10 Indeed, he saw the
social scientific evidence as legally irrelevant: "We are not social
engineers. The United States Constitution dictates that local
governments cannot make decisions on the basis of race.
Consequently, regardless of the perceived negative effects of racial
106. 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
107. Id. at 227.
108. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S .... 127
S. Ct. 2738, 2820 (2007) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
109. Id. at _, 127 S. Ct. at 2821.
110. Id. at -, 127 S. Ct. at 2773 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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imbalance, I will not defer to legislative majorities where the
Constitution forbids it.""'
For him, the dissenters' claimed deference to the democratic
branches was not methodological at all, since they deferred only
because they agreed with the school boards' assessment of the
disputed social scientific evidence. "In my view," Justice Thomas
declared, "to defer to one's preferred result is not to defer at all.""' 2
Paradoxically, two years before, Justice Thomas had taken quite a
different position in Johnson v. California,"3 where he had argued
that federal courts should defer to California prison authorities' view
that temporary racial segregation of newly arrived or transferred
inmates was necessary to institutional security.' And in another case
from last Term, Morse v. Frederick"' (the so-called "Bong Hits 4
Jesus" case, in which the Court upheld the suspension of a student
who unfurled a banner bearing that somewhat opaque slogan at a
school-related event'16), Justice Thomas joined a majority opinion in
which the Court essentially deferred to the determinations of a high
school principal regarding how to balance students' First Amendment
rights against the school's interest in avoiding illegal drug use."7 By
contrast, three of the dissenters in Morse-who were not prepared
there to defer to education officials' judgments-had joined Justice
Breyer in deferring to the school boards' decisions in Parents
Involved."' So perhaps Justice Thomas's critique of claims of
deference applies to every member of the Court, including himself.
With respect to the constitutional significance of small numbers,
the Court's opinion in Parents Involved diverged from its approach in
Carhart II. There, the fact that few women would require access to
the proscribed abortion procedure in order to preserve their health
foreclosed a facial challenge. In Parents Involved, however, the fact
that the challenged policy apparently affected few individuals
reinforced, rather than undercut, its unconstitutionality. Very few
students' choices among schools were actually restricted because of a
student's race: most students either got their first choice or were
denied that choice for entirely race-neutral reasons. According to the
111. Id. at _, 127 S. Ct. at 2779 n.14.
112. Id. at _, 127 S. Ct. at 2779 n.14.
113. 543 U.S. 499 (2005).
114. See id. at 524-28 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
115. 551 U.S.__ 127 S. Ct. 2618 (2007).
116. See id. at __ 127 S. Ct. at 2622-23.
117. See id at __ 127 S. Ct. at 2629-36.
118. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S .... 127
S. Ct. 2738, 2800 (2007) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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Court, "[t]he minimal effect these classifications have on student
assignments, however, suggests that other means would be
effective,""' 9 thus defeating the narrow tailoring prong of strict
scrutiny. 120  But in contrast to Carhart II, the Court viewed those
plaintiffs whose choices were actually constrained by the challenged
policy as the relevant universe for determining whether it burdened
constitutional rights.
Finally, in a move that paralleled the way that Carhart I
purported to harmonize the treatment of facial and as-applied
challenges in abortion cases with the Court's general approach, both
the majority and Justice Kennedy in concurrence seemed to be
moving the doctrine governing race-conscious efforts at integrating
educational institutions towards other bodies of equal protection law.
The majority did so by rejecting any analogy to race-conscious
affirmative action in higher education, which the Court had permitted
in Grutter v. Bollinger,12' explaining that Grutter depended on the
" 'special niche in our constitutional tradition' " occupied by
universities. Parents Involved identified "the unique context of
higher education" as a "key limitation[] on [Grutter's] holding," and
thus concluded that desegregation in K-12 education was "not
governed by Grutter.'
123
In his concurrence in part and concurrence in the judgment,
Justice Kennedy took a somewhat different tack. His opinion
accepted-indeed, it celebrated-the school boards' desire to achieve
racially integrated schools. He found that goal to be a compelling
state interest, at least in part because he recognized the subordinating
effects of racial isolation.124 But he objected to the means the school
boards had chosen: the race-conscious assignment of individual
119. Id. at -, 127 S. Ct. at 2759 (majority opinion).
120. Justice Kennedy agreed, writing that
it is noteworthy that the number of students whose assignment depends on
express racial classifications is limited. I join Part 111-C of the Court's opinion
because I agree that in the context of these plans, the small number of
assignments affected suggests that the schools could have achieved their stated
ends through different means.
Id. at __ 127 S. Ct. at 2792-93 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
121. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003).
122. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at - ,127 S. Ct. at 2754 (quoting Grutter, 539 U.S. at
329).
123. Id.
124. See id. at -, 127 S. Ct. at 2791 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment).
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students. He was confident that equally race-conscious, but less
explicit, action could achieve the same result. The core of Justice
Kennedy's opinion lay in his distinction between school board actions
that looked at individual students and equally race-conscious,
integration-pursuing actions that operated on a more wholesale level:
School boards may pursue the goal of bringing together
students of diverse backgrounds and races through other
means, including strategic site selection of new schools; drawing
attendance zones with general recognition of the demographics
of neighborhoods; allocating resources for special programs;
recruiting students and faculty in a targeted fashion; and
tracking enrollments, performance, and other statistics by race.
These mechanisms are race conscious but do not lead to
different treatment based on a classification that tells each
student he or she is to be defined by race, so it is unlikely any of
them would demand strict scrutiny to be found permissible.125
Many supporters of integrated schools will fasten on this passage
as a roadmap for continued efforts to dismantle segregated schools
and produce what Green v. County School Board"2 6 so aptly called
"just schools."'2 7 And so we should. But this passage does more than
attempt to thread the needle between permissible and impermissible
uses of race. Taken at face value, it would completely transform
existing equal protection doctrine.
To see why requires returning to the origins of strict scrutiny.
Strict scrutiny was the consequence, not the cause, of the Warren
Court's great antidiscrimination decisions. 28 Not until a decade after
Brown did the Court use strict scrutiny in the course of striking down
an explicit racial classification,' 29 and by then, the Court had
essentially dismantled formal Jim Crow, in decisions recognizing that
the purpose behind the challenged racial classifications was the
maintenance of white supremacy. 3 In fact, the first Supreme Court
125. Id. at -, 127 S. Ct. at 2792.
126. 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
127. Id. at 442.
128. Pamela S. Karlan, Easing the Spring: Strict Scrutiny and Affirmative Action After
the Redistricting Cases, 43 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1569, 1569-71 (2002).
129. See McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 196 (1964).
130. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) (stating that the Virginia
prohibition on interracial marriages failed strict scrutiny because "[t]he fact that Virginia
prohibits only interracial marriages involving white persons demonstrates that the racial
classifications ... [reflect] measures designed to maintain White Supremacy"); Anderson
v. Martin, 375 U.S. 399, 402-03 (1964) (striking down a Louisiana law that required that a
candidate's race be included on the ballot because it operated to arouse racial prejudice
against black candidates).
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decision in which strict scrutiny arguably made a difference in
protecting the rights of African Americans came more than a half-
century after Brown, when the Court struck down California's
temporary racial segregation of inmates in its prison system in
Johnson v. California.
Johnson v. California is an outlier in another respect as well.
Few of the equal protection cases African Americans and other
persons of color have brought in the decades since Brown have
involved facial racial classifications. To the contrary, the cases
brought by minority plaintiffs usually involve challenges to facially
neutral laws-for example, the use of admissions tests that screen out
minority applicants or the staggering disparities in criminal sentencing
for drug offenses involving crack and powder cocaine."' To be sure,
if the plaintiffs prove that the government "selected or reaffirmed a
particular course of action at least in part 'because of,' not merely 'in
spite of,' its adverse effects upon an identifiable group,"1' then the
facially neutral law will be treated as a racial classification and
reviewed using strict scrutiny. But the level of scrutiny will usually be
superfluous. The Supreme Court has recognized, in the context of
applying rationality review, that "if the constitutional conception of
'equal protection of the laws' means anything, it must at the very least
mean that a bare ... desire to harm a politically unpopular group
cannot constitute a legitimate," let alone a compelling, "governmental
interest."'33 Thus, proof of an invidious motive would by itself strip
the challenged law of its presumptive legitimacy.
Justice Kennedy's concurrence in Parents Involved divides "race
conscious '"" '  government action into two categories. First, the
government might explicitly classify individuals on the basis of their
race and then assign benefits or burdens based on the racial identity
of the individuals concerned. That is the kind of activity that would
trigger strict scrutiny and that he condemns in Parents Involved.
Alternatively, the government might rely on race-that is, take racial
consequences of its actions into account-without categorizing
individuals on the basis of their racial identities. Justice Kennedy
131. For a recent discussion of this point, see Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. -,
-, 128 S. Ct. 558, 568 (2007).
132. Pers. Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979).
133. U.S. Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973); see also Romer v. Evans,
517 U.S. 620, 634 (1996) (striking down a Colorado constitutional amendment that
discriminated on the basis of sexuality).
134. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S .... 127 S.
Ct. 2738, 2792 (2007) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
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suggests that this form of governmental race consciousness would be
"unlikely" to "demand strict scrutiny to be found permissible.' ' 135
As a historical matter, that simply cannot be right. Consider, for
example, the notorious "grandfather clause" case, Guinn v. United
States,'13 6 or the Tuskegee gerrymander struck down in Gomillion v.
Lightfoot.'3 7 In neither of those cases did the government directly
classify individuals on the basis of race. Rather, it chose formally
race-neutral policies that were designed to achieve particular racially
correlated outcomes-outcomes that in both cases disadvantaged
black citizens. Guinn and Gomillion stand for the proposition that
"[t]he Constitution 'nullifies sophisticated as well as simple-minded
modes' of infringing on constitutional protections."'38 It is hard to
imagine, for example, that Justice Kennedy would have found the
actions of the Denver School Board in Keyes v. School District No.
I,'39 constitutionally permissible. The Supreme Court in Keyes found
that although Denver had never operated a "statutory dual [school]
system,"' 141 the school board had deliberately structured attendance
zones, chosen new school sites, drafted student transfer policies, and
assigned faculty and staff to schools in order to concentrate black and
Latino children in particular schools and to maintain the all-white
character of other schools.'41 The Denver schools of Keyes are a
mirror image of the permissibly race-conscious integrative schools of
Justice Kennedy's vision. Thus, it cannot be the form of, rather than
the motive behind, governmental race-consciousness that alone
determines its constitutionality.
Justice Kennedy's citation of Bush v. Vera,42 one of the Court's
recent decisions involving race-conscious redistricting, perhaps offers
a clue to his thinking. In the context of redistricting, the Court has
come to recognize that government decisionmakers are always aware
of the racial consequences of their choices, and in some sense always
135. Id.
136. 238 U.S. 347 (1915). Guinn involved a challenge to an Oklahoma law that made it
much harder for individuals to vote if they were not the lineal descendants of persons who
were eligible to vote in 1866-before the Fifteenth Amendment prohibited racial
discrimination in voting. Id. at 350-51.
137. 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
138. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 829 (1995) (quoting Lane v.
Wilson, 307 U.S. 268, 275 (1939)).
139. 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
140. Id. at 201.
141. See id. at 201-02, 211-12.
142. 517 U.S. 952 (1996).
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take those consequences into account.'43 Thus, the Court has
significantly relaxed the trigger for strict scrutiny, using it only when
racial considerations have "subordinated traditional race-neutral
districting principles." ' " It has also permitted jurisdictions to justify
their use of race by pointing to the need to comply with provisions of
the Voting Rights Act that go beyond prohibiting unconstitutional
race discrimination. Those provisions "requir[e] states to arrange
their electoral institutions to minimize the lingering effects of prior
unconstitutional discrimination not otherwise chargeable to them, as
well as to mitigate the impact of racially polarized voting that involves
otherwise constitutionally protected private choice.
145
If Justice Kennedy intends to move general equal protection
doctrine toward the approach currently underlying the redistricting
cases, then equal protection law may be shifting implicitly toward a
model in which the goal of integrating democratic institutions-
schools as well as legislatures-justifies race-conscious government
action as long as the action does not rely too explicitly on race.
The doctrinal modifications that the Court adopted in Parents
Involved and Carhart II may have implications for other questions of
constitutional law beyond abortion and school desegregation.
Consider one issue that is currently before the Court: the
constitutionality of the new crop of voter identification laws.'46 These
laws require citizens to provide specified forms of government-issued
identification before being permitted to register or to cast their
ballots.147 Most potentially eligible voters possess the necessary
documentation, but nonetheless hundreds of thousands of citizens
nationwide-particularly elderly, less affluent, disabled, or minority
143. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S_ ____ 127
S. Ct. 2738, 2792 (2007) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)
(" 'Strict scrutiny does not apply merely because redistricting is performed with
consciousness of race.... Electoral district lines are facially race neutral, so a more
searching inquiry is necessary before strict scrutiny can be found applicable in redistricting
cases than in cases of classifications based explicitly on race.' " (alteration in original)
(quoting Vera, 517 U.S. at 958 (O'Connor, J., plurality))).
144. Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 916 (1995). I describe the doctrinal evolution in
considerable detail in Karlan, supra note 128.
145. Karlan, supra note 128, at 1603 (footnote omitted).
146. The Court will address the issue this Term in Crawford v. Marion County Election
Board, No. 07-21 (U.S. argued Jan. 9, 2008).
147. For discussion of these laws and their various provisions, see generally Spencer
Overton, Voter Identification, 105 MICH. L. REV. 631 (2007).
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individuals-do not and might find the process of acquiring them
difficult, costly, or frustrating.
148
How should courts analyze challenges to voter identification
laws? The conventional approach to burdens placed on fundamental
rights is to focus on the impact on the rights holder who faces the
burden.1 49 But-encouraged by a per curiam decision issued early in
the Term in Purcell v. Gonzales"°-the frame may have shifted.
Consider how the Court described the interests at issue in challenges
to draconian voter identification requirements. On the one hand,
plaintiffs have a "strong interest in exercising the 'fundamental
political right' to vote"1 5-an interest that traditionally has subjected
impositions to heightened judicial scrutiny. On the other hand, the
Court identified a countervailing constitutional consideration:
Confidence in the integrity of our electoral processes is
essential to the functioning of our participatory democracy.
Voter fraud drives honest citizens out of the democratic process
and breeds distrust of our government. Voters who fear their
legitimate votes will be outweighed by fraudulent ones will feel
disenfranchised. "[T]he right of suffrage can be denied by a
debasement or dilution of the weight of a citizen's vote just as
effectively as by wholly prohibiting the free exercise of the
franchise." '152
The Court's rhetorical move in Purcell was to equate the injury
imposed by an official denial of the right to vote with the more
psychic injury that comes from a voter's decision not to participate in
a process in which he lacks confidence. This not only "represents a
breathtaking expansion of the concept of vote dilution," but subtly
shifts the focus from whether particular restrictions can be justified to
an assumption "that some level of vote denial or dilution is inherent
in the system and the only question is which group of voters should be
excluded."' 53
Moreover, because voters who are burdened by voter
identification requirements form only a small fraction of the
electorate, the Court has tentatively expressed some skepticism as to
148. See Brief for Petitioners at 12-19, Crawford, No. 07-21 (U.S. Nov. 5, 2007)
(describing the situation in Indiana).
149. See, e.g., Bd. of Estimate v. Morris, 489 U.S. 688, 698 (1989).
150. 549 U.S. -, 127 S. Ct. 5 (2006) (per curiam).
151. Id. at __, 127 S. Ct. at 7 (quoting Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 336 (1972)).
152. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964)).
153. Pamela S. Karlan, New Beginnings and Dead Ends in the Law of Democracy, 68
OHIO ST. L.J. 743, 765 (2007).
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the cognizability of a facial challenge brought by elected officials,
civic groups, and the Indiana Democratic Party, rather than an as-
applied challenge by voters who are denied access to the polls."s If
the Court's ultimate decision in Crawford v. Marion County Election
Board155 further strengthens the resistance to facial challenges
expressed in Carhart H, this may have consequences for constitutional
litigation more generally.
III. THE STRUGGLE FOR THE CONSTITUTIONAL HIGH GROUND
Brown v. Board of Education and Roe v. Wade are two of the
key lightning rods of modern constitutional law. The former has
attained iconic status and serves as the third rail of constitutional law:
touch it and you die.156 And while the latter still inspires fervent
opposition, it also gets described as not just a precedent, but a "super-
duper" one.'57 Thus, when the Court faces cases involving public
school desegregation or abortion rights, part of what the Court does is
to invoke, once again, the mantle of these decisions. In part,
disagreements on the Court in these cases involve struggles over the
meaning of fundamental precedents, as an examination of two critical
passages in the Carhart II and Parents Involved opinions shows.
The former U.S. poet laureate, Robert Pinsky, has a wonderful
phrase in his poem, An Explanation of America: "A country is the
things it wants to see."' 58 A more critical way of putting this point is
Stephen Colbert's concept of "truthiness"-a reliance on gut intuition
and, as M. Colbert says, "[w]hat feels like the right answer, as
154. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 34-38, 64-66, Crawford v. Marion County
Election Bd., No. 07-21 (U.S. argued Jan. 9, 2008). For an extensive and perceptive
discussion of this issue, see generally Elmendorf, supra note 98.
155. No. 07-21 (U.S. argued Jan. 9, 2008).
156. See generally Brad Snyder, How the Conservatives Canonized Brown v. Board of
Education, 52 RUTGERS L. REV. 383 (2000) (describing Brown's apotheosis).
157. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. To Be Chief
Justice of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong.
145 (2005) (statement of Sen. Arlen Specter, Chairman, S. Comm. on the Judiciary) ("I
don't want to coin any phrases on super-precedents. We will leave that to the Supreme
Court. But would you think that Roe might be a super-duper precedent in light ... of 38
occasions to overrule it?"); see also Richmond Med. Ctr. for Women v. Gilmore, 219 F.3d
376, 376 (4th Cir. 2000) (referring to Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833
(1992), as "a decision of super-stare decisis with respect to a woman's fundamental right to
choose whether or not to proceed with a pregnancy"). See generally Michael J. Gerhardt,
Super Precedent, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1204 (2006) (discussing the concept more generally).
158. ROBERT PINSKY, AN EXPLANATION OF AMERICA 8 (1979).
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opposed to what reality will support."'59 In this light, consider this
pivotal passage in Carhart II:
Respect for human life finds an ultimate expression in the
bond of love the mother has for her child. The Act recognizes
this reality as well. Whether to have an abortion requires a
difficult and painful moral decision. While we find no reliable
data to measure the phenomenon, it seems unexceptionable to
conclude some women come to regret their choice to abort the
infant life they once created and sustained. Severe depression
and loss of esteem can follow.
... The State has an interest in ensuring so grave a choice is
well informed. It is self-evident that a mother who comes to
regret her choice to abort must struggle with grief more
anguished and sorrow more profound when she learns, only
after the event, what she once did not know: that she allowed a
doctor to pierce the skull and vacuum the fast-developing brain
of her unborn child, a child assuming the human form.16 °
At one level, Justice Kennedy is correct. Some women surely do
regret having abortions. But is it, to use a phrase that appears
elsewhere in the Court's opinion, a "large fraction of relevant
cases"?16 ' Should that matter? The sole source Justice Kennedy cites
for this proposition is an amicus brief filed on behalf of 180 women
who regret having had abortions sometime in the past thirty years.' 62
The lead amicus is Sandra Cano, who was the "Mary Doe" of Doe v.
Bolton, the companion case to Roe; her regret involves her
participation in the case itself.
163
But there have been roughly forty-five million legal abortions in
the United States since Roe."M How are we to balance what might be
described as Type A regret-the regret women who have had
abortions later feel-against what might be described as Type B
159. See Urban Dictionary: truthiness, http://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?
term=truthiness (last visited Apr. 14, 2008).
160. Gonzales v. Carhart (Carhart 11), 550 U.S ..... 127 S. Ct. 1610, 1634 (2007)
(citations omitted).
161. Id. at_, 127 S. Ct. at 1639.
162. Id. at -, 127 S. Ct. at 1634 (citing Brief of Sandra Cano, the Former "Mary Doe"
of Doe v. Bolton, and 180 Women Injured by Abortion as Amici Curiae in Support of
Petitioner at 22-24, Carhart 11, 550 U.S. -, 127 S. Ct. 1610 (No. 05-380) [hereinafter Brief
of Sandra Cano]).
163. See Brief of Sandra Cano, supra note 162, at app. A.
164. See GUTrMACHER INSTITUTE, FACTS ON INDUCED ABORTION IN THE UNITED
STATES (2008), available at http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/fbinducedabortion.html.
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regret-the regret felt by women who carry unwanted or initially-
wanted-but-now-disastrous pregnancies to term? It may seem equally
"self-evident" that a woman dissuaded from having an abortion who
then suffers health complications that preclude her from successfully
maintaining future pregnancies or who gives birth to a child who soon
dies painfully from irremediable defects will also struggle with
anguished grief and profound sorrow. More fundamentally, what is
the connection between regret and a wish to have been precluded
from making a choice in the first place?
A particularly striking feature of this passage is how, like the
passage in Purcell, it reframes the debate in terms of competing,
commensurable rights. Instead of pitting the fetus's interest (or the
state's interest) against the woman's interest, this articulation
reformulates the central question as how best to vindicate women's
interests. For all the reasons Professor Reva Siegel gives in her
recent work, this formulation marks a stark retreat with respect to
women's equality.165 But ironically, it implicitly recognizes the success
of the very feminist movement it resists, by recasting the terms of the
debate. Instead of pitting the interests of the woman who seeks to
terminate her pregnancy against the state's interests in protecting the
fetus, the Court has recast both sides of the equation as involving
women's autonomy and dignity, precisely the interest that Roe,
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, and the
Court's other decisions protecting a woman's right to obtain an
abortion had identified as central to the constitutional inquiry.
If Carhart I has a touch of Colbert, Parents Involved evokes
memories of a classic scene from Woody Allen's Annie Hall.166 Surely
you remember it: Woody is standing in line outside a movie theater
and overhears the man behind him spouting off about Marshall
McLuhan's views of television.
Woody declares: "You don't know anything about Marshall
McLuhan's work," to which the man replies, "Really? Really? I
happen to teach a class at Columbia called TV, Media and Culture, so
I think that my insights into Mr. McLuhan, well, have a great deal of
validity." At that moment Woody says, "Oh, that's funny, because I
happen to have Mr. McLuhan right here," and McLuhan says, "I
165. For an extensive discussion of the consequences of this point, see generally Reva
B. Siegel, The New Politics of Abortion: An Equality Analysis of Woman-Protective
Abortion Restrictions, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 991.
166. ANNIE HALL (Rollins-Joffe Productions 1977). The quotations in the following
account can be found at On the Media, http://www.onthemedia.org/yore/transcripts/
transcripts_041604_mcluhan.html (last visited Apr. 14, 2008).
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heard, I heard what you were saying. You, you know nothing of my
work. How you ever got to teach a course in anything is totally
amazing."
The Court was quite conscious in Parents Involved that the
Justices were involved in a struggle over the meaning of Brown v.
Board of Education. Chief Justice Roberts's opinion for the Court
sought to end the debate by quoting what the counsel for the Brown
plaintiffs said at oral argument: "'We have one fundamental
contention which we will seek to develop in the course of this
argument, and that contention is that no State has any authority
under the equal-protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to
use race as a factor in affording educational opportunities among its
citizens.' "167 The Court saw "no ambiguity in that statement.'
16 8
So is that the Marshall McLuhan moment? Actually, ... no.
The attorney who made that statement, Robert L. Carter, is now a
distinguished federal district judge. Asked for his reaction to the
Court's statement, Judge Carter came awfully close to repeating
McLuhan's line: " 'All that race was used for at that point in time was
to deny equal opportunity to black people,' Judge Carter said of the
1950s. 'It's to stand that argument on its head to use race the way
they use [it] now.' "169
Judge Carter's reaction is hardly surprising. For at least the past
thirty years-since the publication of Owen Fiss's classic article
Groups and the Equal Protection Clause"7 -- it has been clear that
there are at least two ways of thinking about the central meaning of
Brown. The "antidiscrimination" or "anticlassification" rationale,
which is the approach taken by the Parents Involved majority, sees
the central meaning of the Equal Protection Clause as a prohibition
on the government distinguishing among individuals on the basis of
impermissible criteria, of which race is the epitome. 7' Under this
approach, "[a]t the heart of the Constitution's guarantee of equal
protection lies the simple command that the Government must treat
167. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. -, _, 127 S.
Ct. 2738, 2767-68 (2007) (quoting Transcript of Oral Argument at 7, Brown v. Bd. of
Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (Nos. 1, 2, 4, 10)).
168. Id. at - ,127 S. Ct. at 2767-68.
169. Adam Liptak, The Same Words, but Differing Views, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2007,
at A24. The other surviving lawyer who had argued for the schoolchildren in the
consolidated cases known as Brown "called the chief justice's interpretation
'preposterous.' " Id.
170. Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107
(1976).
171. Id. at 108.
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citizens 'as individuals, not as simply components of a racial, religious,
sexual or national class.' ,172 By contrast, the Parents Involved
dissenters invoked a "moral vision" of the Fourteenth Amendment
173
that rested on what Fiss called the "group-disadvantaging principle"
(an approach that is now more commonly described as reflecting an
"antisubjugation," "antisubordination," or "anticaste" perspective,74 ).
Under this view, the "promise of Brown" was the full integration of
African Americans into American society, rather than the abolition
of formal racial distinctions. To pretend that there is no ambiguity in
the meaning of Brown, then, is to blink reality. But here, even more
than in Carhart H, the Court is acknowledging that constitutional
legitimacy in public school desegregation cases can come only from
keeping faith with Brown.
CONCLUSION
"[H]istory will be heard," the Chief Justice declared in Parents
Involved.175 But what will it be heard to say? As the Chief Justice
recognized elsewhere last Term, "[i]t is a familiar adage that history is
written by the victors., 176 It is of course far too early to tell who the
victors on the Roberts Court will be. Indeed, it may be far too early
even to identify what the central battles will concern: the Justices
who sat on the Court at the time of Brown had not been picked for
their views on equal protection, the Justices who sat on the Court at
the time of Roe had not been grilled during their confirmation
hearings about substantive due process and reproductive autonomy,
and no one was thinking about national security when the members
of the Rehnquist Court were selected. At least in the short term,
however, the Court seems likely to remain highly polarized, and the
issues posed by fundamental Warren, Burger, and Rehnquist Court
cases are likely to remain highly salient.
172. Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 911 (1995) (quoting Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC,
497 U.S. 547, 602 (1990) (O'Connor, J., dissenting)).
173. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at-., 127 S. Ct. at 2836 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
174. See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1515 (2d ed.
1988) (arguing that the Equal Protection Clause embodies "an antisubjugation principle,
which aims to break down legally created or legally reenforced systems of subordination
that treat some people as second-class citizens").
175. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at , 127 S. Ct. at 2767.
176. Brewer v. Quarterman, 550 U.S______ 127 S. Ct. 1706, 1720 (2007) (Roberts, C.J.,
dissenting).
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